Beyond the Symptoms: Finding the Root Cause of the Chaotic Tarasoff Laws by Gamm, Taylor
University of Cincinnati Law Review 
Volume 86 Issue 2 Article 10 
December 2018 
Beyond the Symptoms: Finding the Root Cause of the Chaotic 
Tarasoff Laws 
Taylor Gamm 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr 
Recommended Citation 
Taylor Gamm, Beyond the Symptoms: Finding the Root Cause of the Chaotic Tarasoff Laws, 86 U. Cin. L. 
Rev. 823 (2018) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss2/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and 
Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact 
ronald.jones@uc.edu. 
823 
BEYOND THE SYMPTOMS: FINDING THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE 
CHAOTIC TARASOFF LAWS 
Taylor Gamm* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On July 19, 2010, James Holmes entered a movie theater in Denver, 
Colorado.1 He purchased a ticket for a showing of “The Dark Knight 
Rises” days earlier.2 Soon after the show began, he exited the theater 
through a rear door.3 Eighteen minutes into the film, Holmes reentered 
theater #9, threw two cans of tear gas into the theater, and opened fire.4 
By the time he surrendered to the police, about seven minutes later, 
twelve people were left dead and seventy were injured.5  
Horrifying events like these typically invoke one question: how could 
this have been prevented? In attempting to answer this difficult question 
for atrocities, such as those committed by Holmes, people tend to look 
to those closest to the killer.6 It is only natural for the nation to wonder 
whether anyone had been told of the killer’s plan, whether the victims 
could have been warned, or whether any of the people closest to the 
killer could have prevented the killer from executing the plan.7  
While family members often become the target of these inquiries, 
they also have been directed towards the killer’s therapist with some 
frequency. Unlike when these suspicions are directed at close family 
members, there are massive legal implications for mental health 
professionals and their patients. Demonstrably, James Holmes’ therapist, 
Lynne Fenton, faced at least one lawsuit by the wife of one of Holmes’ 
victims, who alleged that Fenton breached her “duty to use reasonable 
care to protect the public at large.”8 This was not the first time a 
therapist has been the recipient of such an accusation; rather, the Aurora 
Shooting lawsuit was the product of a line of cases that began roughly 
 
* Associate Member, 2016-2017, University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. Colorado Theater Shooting Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/19/us/colorado-
theater-shooting-fast-facts/ (last updated Nov. 30, 2017). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Kelley Wallace, After mass shootings, do parents shoulder some of the blame? CNN 
(October 7, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/07/health/oregon-shooting-parents-blame/. For 
example, the parents of the killers in both the Sandy Hook and after the mass shooting in Roseburg, 
Oregon, faced a lot of scrutiny for not taking more proactive roles in preventing these disasters. Id.  
 7. Id. 
 8. First Amended Complaint at 3, Blunk, v. Fenton, No. 13-cv-00080 (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 
2013),2013 WL 1313894. 
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fifty years ago.9 
In the 1970s, the tragic murder of a young woman and the 
accompanying search for an explanation led to a lawsuit that opened the 
door to holding therapists liable for the violence of their patients. In 
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, the California Supreme 
Court held for the first time that the therapist of a murderer could be 
liable for failing to warn the victim about potential harm.10 Today, 
courts and legislatures remain unsure how to balance the desire to 
prevent horrific events like the Aurora Shooting with the need to 
preserve the confidential therapist-patient relationship.  
This article explores the legal principles behind a therapist’s duty to 
protect against their patients’ violence and the reason there is no 
consensus across the United States on the issue. To do so, Section II 
contains the necessary background information, including relevant tort 
principles and details of the infamous Tarasoff case. Section III(A) 
summarizes the variant Tarasoff laws; Section III(B) identifies the 
defects in the reasoning of the opinion; and Section III(C) argues that 
those defects are the reason this area of law is in a state of disarray. Part 
IV first illuminates the missteps of the Tarasoff court, and then argues 
that the court’s failure to adequately address the elements of duty and 
causation produced an insufficient basis for the subsequent codifications 
of the Tarasoff duty. Finally, this article concludes that the fifty 
jurisdictions within the United States must become more coherent so 
that sound legal reasoning is established regarding the duty of therapists 
in protecting third parties against the violence of their patience. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
An in depth understanding of both the legal and factual underlaying 
of Tarasoff are indispensable to an effective determination of how 
Tarasoff laws developed. Therefore, this section first discusses the key 
principles of tort law, and more specifically, the negligence principles, 
which are pertinent to a mental health professional’s liability. Secondly, 
this section details the horrific set of facts that was brought in front of 
the California Supreme Court that led to a revolutionary holding, which 
will also be described at length.  
 
 9. Holmes’ therapist was not ultimately held liable. On August 8, 2016, the Plaintiff voluntarily 
dismissed her case against Fenton and Colorado University. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Case by 
Plaintiff, Blunk, 13-cv-00080 (D. Colo. Aug. 11, 2016).  
 10. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 344-45 (Cal. 1976).  
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A.  Tort and Negligence Principles 
Modern tort law can be traced back to Oliver Wendell Holmes, who 
made one of the first persuasive arguments for tort liability based upon 
ancient common law notions of “eye-for-an-eye” justice.11 Though tort 
law has evolved drastically from its original form, even later 
developments of tort law, such as negligence, are founded in this same 
theory, termed “reciprocity.”12 Thus, the definition of “negligence” 
incorporates the quintessentially human response that when a person 
fails to adhere to certain standards set by society, there must be 
retribution.13 Negligence is “[t]he failure to exercise the standard of care 
that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar 
situation.”14 The law that governs negligence claims is not uniform 
across the United States; rather, each state has developed its own 
common law that dictates how any single case may be resolved. 
Nevertheless, a basic negligence claim in any jurisdiction has four 
elements that must be proved by the plaintiff: (1) the defendant owed a 
duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) causation; 
and (4) the plaintiff was harmed.15 A failure-to-warn claim against a 
mental health professional is a claim rooted in negligence; however, the 
four elements detailed below have different implications for this specific 
claim.  
1. Duty 
Duty is an existential element of negligence, and yet is an elusive 
term to define.16 The notion of duty has developed considerably over the 
years, and although courts are moving towards a more uniform 
definition, its exact contours still provide a source of confusion and 
disagreement among courts and legal scholars.17 Nowhere is this debate 
 
 11. M. A. Geistfield, Hidden in Plaint Sight: The Normative Source of Modern Tort Law, 91 
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1517, 1519 (2016). 
 12. Id. at 1550-1561. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Negligence, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 15. Id. 
 16. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 470 So. 2d 1060, 1079 (Ala. 1984) (Torbert, C.J., dissenting) 
(“Tort duties are difficult to judicially define or confine; although most courts are content with the 
enunciation of standards, such as ‘reasonable care,’ in defining tort duties, wherever courts enunciate 
particular concrete rules, the process becomes endless, with attempts to cover each fact situation 
specifically as it arises, ultimately causing more confusion than clarity as the specific rules inevitably 
conflict.”). 
 17. Peter Lake, Common Law Duty in Negligence Law: The Recent Consolidation of a 
Consensus on the Expansion of the Analysis of Duty and the New Conservative Liability Limiting Use of 
Policy Considerations, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1503, 1508 (1997).  
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as eminent as in the context of whether or to what extent a 
psychotherapist owes a duty to potential victims of patients.18 Beginning 
with the basic premise of duty is helpful to form a complete 
understanding of this confusion. Thus, this section explores the 
Restatement of Tort’s definition of duty, the prevailing definition of 
duty as espoused by Justice Cardozo, and an alternate view of duty, as 
explained by Justice Andrews.   
a.  Restatement of Torts  
The Restatement of Torts defines duty in terms of what an “actor” is 
required to do.19 Section four of the Restatement explains that duty:  
 
denotes the fact that the actor is required to conduct himself in a 
particular manner at the risk that if he does not do so he becomes 
subject to liability to another to whom the duty is owed for any 
injury sustained by such other, of which that actor's conduct is a 
legal cause.20  
 
In the Restatement (Second), duty is not an element of negligence,21 
rather it derives legal significance from its use in defining what 
negligence means or what standard of care is owed.22 One scholar 
summarily described the Restatement’s use of duty as a term “integrated 
into the identity of other primary concepts.”23 The Restatement clearly 
expresses that there is no general duty “to control the conduct of a third 
person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another . . . .”24 
However, there are two exceptions to this rule.25 First, a duty to a third 
person is owed if “a special relation exists between the actor and the 
third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third 
person’s conduct.”26 The second exception, which is meticulously 
analyzed in determinations of a mental health professional’s duty, 
creates a duty where “a special relation exists between the actor and the 
other which gives to the other a right to protection.”27  
 
 18. See e.g., Paul B. Herbert & Kathryn A. Young, Tarasoff at Twenty-Five, J. AM. ACAD, 
PSYCHIATRY LAW 30:275–81 (2002). 
 19. Lake, supra note 17, at 1518.  
 20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 21. Id.at § 281. 
 22. Lake, supra note 17, at 1514.  
 23. Id. 
 24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 315 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).  
 25. Id. at § 315(a)-(b). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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In many ways, the Restatement’s treatment of duty is deficient 
compared to the intricate analysis courts typically engage in. This is 
largely because duty was not given much weight as a tool by which 
courts could limit liability until after the Restatement was published.28 
Therefore, case law is responsible for developing duty into the concept 
as we know it today.29 No person was responsible for this development 
more than Justice Cardozo.30 His description of duty, articulated in a 
case perhaps more iconic than Tarasoff—Palsgraf v. Long Island R. 
Co—represents the view that most courts have since adopted.31 
b.  Cardozo on Duty 
Justice Cardozo’s view of duty focused on a “zone of danger” and the 
primary consideration was whether the plaintiff was foreseeable.32 More 
specifically, according to Cardozo, duty extends only as far as the 
reasonably vigilant eye would perceive an “orbit of danger.”33  For 
example, in Palsgraf, Cardozo refused to extend a duty from the railroad 
worker who inadvertently dropped a box of explosives to a woman who 
was injured from the explosion despite being many sections away in the 
station.34 Contrary to some former jurisprudence, Cardozo held that a 
determination of liability was always anterior to a finding that a duty 
existed between the parties.35  
Cardozo’s espousal of duty, however, left many questions.36 A line of 
California tort cases that interpreted and applied his notion of duty 
created a multi-factor balancing test,37 which can now be seen in some 
form in most states.38 The California Supreme Court has consistently 
 
 28. Lake, supra note 17, at 1512-13. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 1510-1512. 
 31. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).  
 32. Id. at 100-01 (“The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.”). 
 33. Id. at 100.  
 34. Id. at 101. 
 35. Id. at 99. 
 36. Lake, supra note 17, at 1513. 
 37. Id. at 1516 (“Dillon, Rowland, Biakanja and particularly Tarasoff Link to the text of the note 
have become famous and widely cited for several foundational points with respect to duty.”). 
 38. See e.g., Taylor v. Smith, 892 So. 2d 887, 891-92 (Ala. 2004) (“The existence of a duty is 
determined by a number of factors, including (1) the nature of the defendant's activity; (2) the 
relationship between the parties; and (3) the type of injury or harm threatened. The key factor is whether 
the injury was foreseeable by the defendant.”); Wertheim v. Pima Cnty., 122 P.3d 1, 6 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2005) (“Courts traditionally fix the duty point by balancing factors, including the reasonable 
expectations of parties and society generally, the proliferation of claims, the likelihood of unlimited or 
insurer-like liability, disproportionate risk and reparation allocation, and public policies affecting the 
expansion or limitation of new channels of liability.”); Gast v. Fountain, 870 P.2d 506, 508 (Colo. App. 
1993) (“Several factors are relevant in making this [duty] determination including the risk involved, the 
5
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laid out six factors which are dispositive to the question of whether a 
duty exists: 
 
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty 
that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection 
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral 
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing 
future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and 
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise 
care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost 
and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.39  
c.  Andrew’s Version of Duty 
In his dissent in Palsgraf, Justice Andrews espoused a notion of duty 
very different from that of Justice Cardozo.40 Rather than limiting 
liability on the basis of whether the defendant owed some ethereal duty 
to the plaintiff, Justice Andrews preferred to limit liability on a 
causation determination.41 Duty was an inappropriate way to cut off 
liability, according to Andrews, because “[e]veryone owes to the world 
at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably 
threaten the safety of others.”42 Thus, under his theory, there could 
never be a finding that a defendant did not owe a duty to a plaintiff.43 
Justice Andrews criticized Justice Cardozo’s “zone of danger” limitation 
on duty as a defectively narrow construction of the word on the grounds 
that negligence is a cause of action based on the relationships between 
human beings.44 Andrews explained that there is a relationship not only 
between a man and those he reasonably expects to injure, but also 
“between him and those whom he does in fact injure. If his act has a 
tendency to harm someone, it harms him a mile away as surely as it does 
those on the scene.”45 Therefore, the key factor in determining if a 
plaintiff has a viable negligence claim is a policy determination, coined 
“proximate cause.”46 A later section discusses proximate cause in more 
 
foreseeability and likelihood of injury as weighed against the social utility of defendant's conduct, the 
magnitude of the burden required to guard against the injury, and the consequence of placing the burden 
upon the defendant.”). 
 39. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976). 
 40. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101-05 (Andrews, J., dissenting).  
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 102-03. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 102. 
 45. Id.   
 46. Id. at 354. Justice Andrews describes proximate cause indefinitely, referencing first as 
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detail. 
2.  Breach 
The second element a plaintiff must prove is that the defendant 
breached the legal duty that was owed.47 Breach of duty is “the act or 
omission, however broad or general, [that] must be averred to have been 
negligently done; it will not suffice to say that due to defendant's 
negligence, plaintiff was injured.”48 The determination of whether a 
defendant breached the duty is, unlike that of whether a duty is owed, a 
factual one made by the jury.49 Further, the reasonable care owed in 
each case is the same; however, whether that duty was breached is a fact 
specific inquiry that varies with each case.50 This element may be 
proved through a myriad of ways. For example, a plaintiff may offer 
evidence that the breach was a defendant’s failure to adhere to a 
statute51 or to an industry custom.52  
3.  Causation  
The third element a plaintiff must prove in a negligence claim is that 
the defendant’s breach of duty caused the plaintiff’s harm.53 Typically, 
in determining if the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the plaintiff’s 
harm, two separate inquiries must be made: first as to the cause in fact 
and, second, as to the proximate cause.54 Though these determinations 
are not made uniformly across jurisdictions, there are some general 
procedures that courts follow.  
In establishing cause in fact, a plaintiff must show that but-for the 
 
something “must be, at the least, something without which the event would not happen.” Id. He then 
lists a number of factors determinative to proximate cause: The court must ask itself whether there was a 
natural and continuous sequence between cause and effect. Was the one a substantial factor in producing 
the other? Was there a direct connection between them, without too many intervening causes? Is the 
effect of cause on result not too attenuated? Is the cause likely, in the usual judgment of mankind, to 
produce the result? Or by the exercise of prudent foresight could the result be foreseen? Is the result too 
remote from the cause, and here we consider remoteness in time and space.” Id.  
 47. Ladd v. San Mateo, 911 P.2d 496, 497-98 (Cal. 1996). 
 48. Walter G. Schwartz, Negligence Pleading: Alleging Defendants Breach of Duty, 35 CAL. L. 
REV. 2, 269 (1947). 
 49. Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 248 P.3d 1170, 1172-73 (Cal. 2011). 
 50. Id.  
 51. Thomas v. McDonald, 667 So. 2d 594, 596 (Miss. 1995) (“Violations of statutes generally 
constitute negligence per se”). 
 52. The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).  
 53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (AM. L. INST. 1979). 
 54. Semi-Tech Litig., LLC v. Bankers Tr. Co., 353 F. Supp. 2d 460, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(“Causation of course has two major components: cause-in-fact, or ‘but-for’ cause, and proximate 
cause.”). 
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defendant’s negligence, the injury would not have occurred.55 Thus, for 
example, where a plaintiff proved only that he might not have fallen off 
a bridge if a railing had been built higher, he failed to prove but-for 
causation.56 But-for causation is a jury determination, unless reasonable 
minds could not differ.57  
Proximate cause, however, is a legal determination reserved for the 
judge.58 In jurisdictions that do not analyze the element of duty as the 
primary limitation on liability, proximate cause stands in its place.59 
This method is embodied in Justice Andrews dissent in Palsgraf.60 In 
that case, Justice Cardozo, writing for the majority, held that “causation, 
remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the case before us.”61 However, 
because Justice Andrews asserted that duty incorporated a much broader 
range of relationships, proximate cause was the appropriate way to cut 
off liability.62 Proximate cause is a balancing of policy considerations 
based on certain factors, which are dispositive as to whether the 
defendant’s actions were too remote to be deemed the proximate cause 
of the plaintiff’s harm.63  
Factors that tend to demonstrate proximate cause are: (1) 
establishment of but-for causation; (2) a natural and continuous 
sequence between cause and effect; (3) the act was a substantial factor in 
the result; (4) there was a direct connection, as opposed to intervening 
events, between the cause and effect; (5) there was a high likelihood of 
injury; and (6) the defendant could have foreseen that harm to the 
plaintiff would have resulted.64 For example, after a consideration of 
these factors, where a plaintiff burned herself carrying boiling water, the 
court held a landlord-defendant was not liable because his failure to 
provide heat was not direct enough to be considered the proximate cause 
 
 55. Cay v. Dep’t of Transp., 631 So. 2d 393, 396 (La. 1994).  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at 396 
 58. Brown v. Phila. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 760 A.2d 863, 868 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). 
“Proximate cause ‘is primarily a problem of law’ and ‘it is a Pennsylvania court’s responsibility to 
evaluate the alleged facts and refuse to find an actor’s conduct the legal cause of harm when it appears 
to the court highly extraordinary that [the actor's conduct] should have brought about the harm.’” Id. 
Thus, proximate cause must “be determined by the judge and it must be established before the question 
of actual cause is put to the jury.” Id. 
 59. See e.g., First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 769 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(“Central to the notion of proximate cause is the idea that a person is not liable to all those who may 
have been injured by his conduct, but only to those with respect to whom his acts were ‘a substantial 
factor in the sequence of responsible causation,’ and whose injury was "reasonably foreseeable or 
anticipated as a natural consequence”) (internal citations omitted). 
 60. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
 61. Id.    
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id.  
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of the plaintiff’s injury.65 
4.  Harm 
The final element a plaintiff must prove before recovering monetary 
damages is that he or she experienced some physical or emotional harm. 
The Restatement of Torts frames this element as an “invasion.”66 A 
comment in the Restatement states that there is a “requirement that the 
interest which is invaded must be one which is protected, not only 
against acts intended to invade it, but also against unintentional 
invasions.”67 Thus, one limitation on liability through this element is 
that the law does not generally provide recourse where a plaintiff 
suffered only economic harm.68  
Though there are minor variations within each jurisdiction, courts do 
not generally stray from this general paradigm of a negligence action. Of 
course, for every general rule, there are exceptions; one of which was 
created by the Supreme Court of California in Tarasoff.  
B.  The Facts of Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California 
At the time it was decided, Tarasoff was arguably the most expansive 
application of Cardozo’s version of duty.69 To appreciate how the 
Supreme California Court reached its holding, however, it is imperative 
to be fully informed of the facts of the case, which are as catastrophic as 
the holding was revolutionary. Thus, this section details the facts that 
catalyzed the lawsuit and the resulting holding.  
On October 27, 1969, Prosenjit Poddar killed Tatiana Tarasoff.70 
Poddar and Tatiana first met in August 1968 at folk dancing classes 
hosted by the university they both attended—The University of 
California. The two began seeing each other regularly, and on New 
Year’s Eve Tatiana kissed Poddar, who took this to be a sign that they 
had become involved in a romantic relationship.71 However, Tatiana 
disenchanted him of this belief when she informed him that she was 
 
 65. Laureano v. Louzoun, 560 N.Y.S.2d 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
 66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (AM. L. INST. 1965). 
 67. Id.  
 68. 532 Madison Ave Gourmet Foods, Inc v Finlandia Center, Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1100-01 
(N.Y. 2001).  
 69. Fillmore Buckner & Marvin Firestone, “Where the Public Peril Begins”: 25 Years After 
TARASOFF, J. LEGAL MED. 21: 2 (2001) (“The majority’s expansion of that rule takes us from the 
world of reality into the wonderland of clairvoyance”).  
 70. People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342, 344-46 (Cal. 1974). 
 71. Id.  
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seeing other people and was uninterested in a committed relationship.72  
This rejection caused him deep emotional distress.73 Poddar became 
disheveled and reclusive; he let his health and schooling go by the 
wayside; and he often spoke disjointedly and wept.74 Poddar met with 
Tatiana multiple times throughout the spring and taped the meetings to 
ascertain her reasons for not wanting a relationship.75  
Poddar’s state continued to deteriorate until Tatiana left for South 
America that summer.76 At the suggestion of a friend, Poddar began 
seeing a therapist.77 During these sessions, Poddar revealed to his 
therapist, Dr. Moore, his intentions of killing an unnamed girl readily 
identifiable as Tatiana78 when she returned home from her trip in 
Brazil.79 Unbeknownst to his therapist, Poddar had also convinced 
Tatiana’s brother to share an apartment with him.80 In October, Tatiana 
returned home from her trip and Poddar quit seeing his psychiatrist.81 
Dr. Moore, with the concurrence of two other psychiatrists, wrote to the 
campus police to recommend that Poddar be civilly committed because, 
in his opinion, Poddar was suffering from acute and severe 
schizophrenia and was a dangerous person.82  
Three officers detained Poddar; however, satisfied that he was 
rational and upon Poddar promising that he would stay away from 
Tatiana, the officers released Poddar.83 The officers did not warn 
Tatiana or her family of the potential danger posed against her.84 The 
Director of the Department of Psychiatry at Cowell Memorial Hospital 
directed that the note warning the police, along with any notes by 
Poddar’s therapist, Dr. Moore, be destroyed, and that no action be taken 
to detain Poddar.85  
On October 27, 1969, Poddar went to Tatiana’s home but was turned 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 344-45. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334, ?? (Cal. 1976) (“Dr. Moore told 
said officers that at a psychotherapy session on August 18 Poddar had informed Moore that he was 
going to kill ‘an unnamed girl, readily identifiable as Tatiana Tarasoff, when she returned home to 
Berkeley from Brazil’”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Poddar, 518 P.2d at 344-45. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 341-42. 
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away by her mother.86 Later that day, he returned to her home armed 
with a pellet gun and a kitchen knife.87 This time, he found her alone.88 
Tatiana refused to speak with him, and when he persisted she 
screamed.89 Poddar shot her with the pellet gun and she took off from 
the house; Poddar then pursued, caught, and repeatedly stabbed her until 
she died.90 Poddar was convicted of second degree murder, but was 
released five years later after a successful appeal of the jury 
instructions.91 California declined to retry the case, contingent upon 
Poddar’s relocation back to India.92  
After the criminal trial, Tatiana Tarasoff’s parents filed a wrongful 
death suit against a plethora of individuals.93 The defendants included 
Dr. Moore, the psychologist who examined Poddar and decided that he 
should be committed, the two psychiatrists who concurred in Moore’s 
decision, one doctor who countermanded Moore’s decision and 
suggested that no action be taken to confine Poddar, and, finally, the 
three police officers involved in the detainment and release of Poddar.94 
The Tarasoffs alleged multiple charges against the various parties for the 
failure to detain Poddar and the failure to warn Tatiana; however, only 
the failure to warn could withstand scrutiny, as the therapist and police 
officer defendants could claim governmental immunity against the 
failure to detain charge.95  
C.  The Decision in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California  
The underlying issue the court resolved was whether the therapist 
owed a duty to the potential victim of the patient’s violence.96 The court 
began its discussion reiterating the general rule that:  
 
whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position 
with regard to another . . . that if he did not use ordinary care and 
 
 86. Poddar, 518 P.2d at 244-45. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Douglas Mossman, The Future of “The Duty to Protect:” Scientific and Legal Perspectives 
on Tarasoff’s Thirtieth Anniversary: Article Critique of Pure Risk Assessment or, Kant Meets Tarasoff, 
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 523, 534 (2006).   
 92. Id.  
 93. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
 94. Id. at 340 n. 2. 
 95. Id. at 352-53. The court additionally held that as “to the police defendants, we conclude that 
they do not have any such special relationship to either Tatiana or to Poddar sufficient to impose upon 
such defendants a duty to warn respecting Poddar's violent intentions.” Id.  
 96. Id. at 342. 
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skill in his own conduct . . . he would cause danger of injury to the 
person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care 
and skill to avoid such danger.97  
 
The court then identified certain situations that warrant departure 
from the general rule.98 Although the court balanced a number of 
considerations, the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff was foremost 
in determining whether a departure was justified in this situation.99 
Common law, however, limits this exception by requiring a special 
relationship between the defendant and the dangerous person or the 
potential victim.100 Finding the relationship between a therapist and a 
patient sufficient to meet this requirement, the California Supreme Court 
concluded that “such a relationship may support affirmative duties for 
the benefit of third parties.”101  
Determining what exactly the therapist’s duty required was a 
contentious issue that was resolved in the court’s first opinion, though 
according to defense advocates, with gross injustice.102 When the court 
initially considered the issue, it imposed on therapists a specific duty to 
warn potential victims of their patients’ threat.103 Consequently, the 
failure of the defendant therapist to warn Tatiana or her family members 
constituted a cognizable claim.104 An effort spearheaded by the Northern 
California Psychiatric Society convinced the court to rehear the case.105  
Eighteen months later, the court issued a second opinion which 
purported to allay the concerns of the amicus curiae, who argued that 
the duty to warn would have detrimental effects on the practice of 
 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. Specifically, the court mentions that a “a hospital must exercise reasonable care to control 
the behavior of a patient which may endanger other persons. A doctor must also warn a patient if the 
patient's condition or medication renders certain conduct, such as driving a car, dangerous to others.” Id. 
at 343-44.  
 99. Id. at 342. The other considerations include “degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered 
injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the 
moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the 
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with 
resulting liability for breach, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” Id.  
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 343-44.  
 102. Daniel J. Givelber, William J. Bowers & Carolyn L. Blitch, Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An 
Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 443, 449 (1984). 
 103. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 529 P. 2d 553, 561 (Cal. 1974), overruled by Tarasoff, 
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). The complaints can also be amended to assert causes of action against the 
police defendants for failure to warn on the theory that the officers' conduct increased the risk of 
violence. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Givelber, Bowers & Blitch, supra note 102.  
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psychiatry.106 Consequently, to lessen the burden on therapists, the court 
pronounced a less specific duty—that duty of “reasonable care.”107 The 
court explained that “the discharge of this duty of due care will 
necessarily vary with the facts of each case, in each instance the 
adequacy of the therapist’s conduct must be measured against the 
negligence standard of the rendition of reasonable care under the 
circumstances.”108 The court further elaborated that if the duty of 
reasonable care required a therapist to warn a potential victim, patient-
therapist confidentiality would not constitute sufficient justification for 
failing to do so.109 The court eloquently explained that “the protective 
privilege ends where the public peril begins.”110 
III. DISCUSSION 
 Perhaps unbeknownst to the California Supreme Court, its holding in 
Tarasoff would have an impact that reached the opposite coast of the 
United States and every state in between. This section first describes the 
different ways Tarasoff impacted tort liability in various jurisdictions. 
Secondly, it discusses the practical consequences of the severe 
interjurisdictional variance.  
A.  Effects of Tarasoff 
As each state wrangled with the implications of the newfound duty 
created in Tarasoff, various positions emerged. These positions can be 
categorized three main groups: duty states, permission states, and anti-
Tarasoff states.111 This section describes the ways in which Tarasoff has 
been codified across many jurisdictions and details some important 
variations within each subgroup.  
1.  Duty States  
When California itself codified the Tarasoff holding, it both limited 
and expanded the court of appeal’s holding.112 First, it more clearly and 
 
 106. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d 334. 
 107. Id. at 345-46 (“once a therapist does in fact determine, or under applicable professional 
standards reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others, 
he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of that danger”). 
 108. Id. at 349-50. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 347-48.  
 111. Herbert & Young, supra note 18, at 277. 
 112. Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92 (Lexis 2013).  
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narrowly set out that a psychotherapist’s113 duty is triggered only when 
“the patient has communicated to the psychotherapist a serious threat of 
physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims.”114 
However, the California Statute also explicitly required that when a 
psychotherapist’s duty to a third party is triggered, that duty is 
discharged when the therapist makes “reasonable efforts to 
communicate the threat to the victim or victims and to a law 
enforcement agency.”115 In so doing, the legislature placed a more 
stringent requirement on therapists to warn specific people, whereas 
under the Tarasoff holding no such duty was in place. California, along 
with twenty-eight other states, falls under the category of a “duty 
state.”116 
The general formula for the duty espoused in these jurisdictions is 
that a psychotherapist has a duty to warn either the victim or law 
enforcement after a patient makes an explicit and specific threat of 
physical harm.117 One important variation within these jurisdictions is 
whether the state incorporates the therapist’s judgment into when the 
duty is triggered.118 For instance, Idaho’s Tarasoff statute requires the 
therapists to make a determination of whether the patient “has the 
apparent intent and ability to carry out such a threat” before the 
therapist’s duty to warn the victim is initiated.119 Other jurisdictions, 
contrarily, impose a duty to warn almost as a functional matter 
 
 113. Interestingly, California uses this term differently than the American Psychologist 
Association. Psychotherapy was previously a contentious area of the field, but has recently been 
validated by the APA. According to the APA, psychotherapy is the informed and intentional application 
of clinical methods and interpersonal stances derived from established psychological principles for the 
purpose of assisting people to modify their behaviors, cognitions, emotions, and/or other personal 
characteristics in directions that the participants deem desirable.” The only guidance provided in 
California law regarding who constitutes a “psychotherapist" is found in the state’s rules of evidence, 
which define psychotherapist the way that most states define the mental health professional. Recognition 
of Psychotherapy Effectiveness, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST ASSOCIATION (August, 2012), 
http://www.apa.org/about/policy/resolution-psychotherapy.aspx (quoting Norcross, 1990, p. 218-220).  
 114. Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92. Arguably, subsequent interpretation of the language re-expanded 
when the duty kicks in. See Barry v. Turek, 267 Cal. Rptr. 553, 555 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (interpreting 
this language to mean “whether [the plaintiff] has sufficiently shown that [the defendant] ought to have 
been aware that [the patient] presented a serious threat of physical violence”). 
 115. Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92 (emphasis added). 
 116. National Conference of State Legislatures “Mental Health Professional’s Duty To Warn” 
(Apr. 23, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental-health-professionals-duty-to-warn.aspx. 
The other “Duty States” are: Washington, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, Nebraska, 
Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Louisiana, Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, 
Indiana, Ohio, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Vermont, New 
Hampshire, and New York. Id.  
 117. Herbert & Young, supra note 18, at 277. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Idaho Code § 6-1902 (Lexis 2016). 
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whenever an explicit threat is made.120  
2.  Permission States 
A second subgroup of jurisdictions are those which permit, but do not 
require, a therapist to breach the duty of confidentiality to warn a third 
party of the patient’s violence.121 A minority of sixteen states belong to 
this group, which provides much more discretion in the hands of the 
therapist.122 A key variation within this group, however, is how much 
discretion the statute affords therapists.123 In Illinois, for example, the 
therapist may disclose a patient’s communications “when, and to the 
extent, in the therapist’s sole discretion, disclosure is necessary to warn 
or protect a specific individual against whom a recipient has made a 
specific threat of violence.”124 The subgroup with statute’s like Illinois’ 
essentially provide therapists with the ability to breach confidentiality, 
while also providing immunity from third party claims when they chose 
to remain silent.125  
On the other side of the spectrum, within this group, there are states 
that do not explicitly give discretion to therapists.126 Therapists in these 
jurisdictions may not be able to escape liability to third parties because, 
although the language of the statutes is permissive, it is possible that 
courts may interpret this ambiguous language to impose some positive 
duty to warn when the therapist receives a threat of physical violence.127  
3. Anti-Tarasoff Jurisdictions 
The final group contains an even smaller group of states. In fact, only 
Nevada, North Dakota, Maine, and North Carolina have rejected a 
Tarasoff duty.128 North Carolina has judicially eliminated the Tarasoff 
duty, whereas the remaining states do not have explicit Tarasoff rules, 
but strictly enforce confidentiality.129 In these states, mental health 
 
 120. See e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-1102 (LexisNexis 2015) (“A mental health professional 
has a duty to warn of or take reasonable precautions to provide protection from violent behavior only if 
the patient has communicated to the mental health professional an actual threat of physical violence by 
specific means against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim.”).  
 121. Herbert & Young, supra note 18, at 278-79. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. Other states with similar statutes are Oregon, New York, and Texas.  
 124. Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. Ch. 740, § 110/11(viii) (2015). 
 125. § 110/3. 
 126. Herbert & Young, supra note 18, at 279. These states include Alaska, Connecticut, the 
District of Columbia, Florida, Rhode Island, and West Virginia. Id. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Supra note 116. 
 129. See Gregory v. Kilbride, 565 S.E.2d 685, 692 (N.C. 2002) (specifically not recognizing 
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professionals are forced to make judgments about whether to warn 
potential victims, attempting to balance their obligation to keep their 
client’s information confidential with the fear of a potential lawsuit from 
a victim of their patient. 
B. Implications of Tarasoff Laws and the Need for Consistency  
The drastic interjurisdictional variance of Tarasoff laws is cause for 
concern. First, upon the recognition that states codified some version of 
the Tarasoff to achieve some specific policy aims,130 one question 
necessarily results: which state has the correct policy aim?131 Tarasoff 
statutes govern matters of life or death, and it is consequently of the 
upmost importance to determine which policy aim promotes the most 
good. This inquiry dictates another serious inquiry—how to measure the 
success of the Tarasoff statutes. The number of deaths Tarasoff has 
prevented is, as a practical matter, impossible to quantify;132 however, 
whether the implementation of a duty to warn effected the homicide rate 
of the respective state has been studied.133 The results suggest that 
Tarasoff laws may actually be counterproductive to the goal they set out 
to achieve.134 In fact, one researcher found that imposing a mandatory 
duty to warn on mental health professionals is associated with a five 
percent increase in the homicide rate.135 Therefore, the majority position 
imposing mandatory reporting may not necessarily represent the most 
successful legislation.  
Yet, another significant practical concern that cannot be overlooked is 
the effect of the ambiguous and inconsistent Tarasoff laws on the day-
to-day practices of mental health professionals. Foremost criticisms 
against Tarasoff laws are questions regarding therapists’ ability to 
determine whether a patient is indeed “dangerous” and the 
corresponding risk of false positives.136 While some studies suggest 
 
Tarasoff duty to protect in a case where a patient made an explicit threat to murder his wife and himself 
in the thirty-six hours he was with his therapist leading up to the deaths).  
 130. Ronald D. Richards Jr. and Madhvi P. Richards, A Tale of Two States: Beware of Tarasoff 
Extension for Hearsay Communications, 2(5) PSYCHIATRY (EGMONT) 40-6 (2005). 
 131. Herbert & Young, supra note 18.  
 132. Griffin Edwards, Doing Their Duty: An Empirical Analysis of the Unintended Effect of 
Tarasoff v. Regents on Homicidal Activity, 57 J. LAW & ECON. 321 (2014) (explaining that his results 
may be exaggerated if Tarasoff does prevent some murders, but unable to specify that effect).  
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Vanessa Merton, Law and Psychiatry Part II: Confidentiality and the “Dangerous” Patient: 
Implications of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263, 266-68 (1982); but see 
Mossman, supra note 91, at 570 (introducing the argument that it is better to have ten people be detained 
due to false warnings rather than one person be murdered because of a “false negative”).   
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therapist feel confident in their ability to assess this risk, others present 
this as a serious downfall to Tarasoff laws.137  
A secondary source of discomfort among therapists caused by 
Tarasoff laws is a sense of infringement on their professional 
judgment.138 Specifically, therapists in strict jurisdictions find the 
constraint Tarasoff laws impose on their discretionary abilities in how to 
deal with patients who are “dangerous” to be unnecessarily limiting.139 
It cannot be meritoriously argued that therapists in mandatory warning 
jurisdictions are more competent in making this determination; thus, 
imposing this requirement on only some therapists is justifiably seen as 
an injustice. The variation in laws produces an element of 
unpredictability that mental health professionals must endure, especially 
in those jurisdictions that have not clearly codified the duty.  
Lastly, the effects of the inconsistent Tarasoff laws on the 
relationship between patients and their therapists must be 
acknowledged. In fact, it is the degradation of this relationship that is 
posited as the reason why mandatory warning states have an increased 
homicide rate.140 The same unpredictability faced by therapists because 
of the ambiguously codified duties will necessarily effect their patients, 
as well. The symptoms of the disorderly state of the law are these 
complications and to resolve the problem, it is vital to address not only 
the symptoms, but the root cause. The remainder of this article posits 
that the root cause of the inconsistent Tarasoff laws is the defective legal 
reasoning utilized in Tarasoff itself.  
IV.  ARGUMENT 
Though granularly analyzing the legal reasoning behind a decision 
may appear to have theoretical implications only, Tarasoff demonstrates 
the palpable effects that a mishap in analysis can have. This section sets 
out those missteps of the Tarasoff court in finding that Poddar’s 
therapist was subject to liability because of the murder of Tatiana 
Tarasoff. It then argues that the court’s failure to adequately address the 
 
 137. See e.g., Givelber, Bowers & Blitch, supra note 102 (“Thus, therapists appear to believe that 
there are objective professional standards for evaluating dangerousness or, at a minimum, that 
dangerousness is a little like hard core obscenity in that they ‘know it when they see it,’ even if they 
can’t define it.”); compare to Merton, supra note 136 (“Conceding the low reliability and questionable 
validity of psychiatric diagnoses—what detractors have called psychiatric ‘labels’—some psychiatrists 
maintain that susceptibility to error is even more pronounced in their prognoses, and most problematic 
of all when their task is the prediction of violent behavior”).  
 138. Merton, supra note 136 (“What seems most disturbing to the psychiatrists who oppose the 
Tarasoff doctrine, however, is not just their potential liability for wrong choices, but the infringement on 
their professional discretion to make such choices.”).  
 139. Id. at 304-06.  
 140. Edwards, supra note 132.  
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elements of causation and duty produced an insufficient basis for the 
subsequent codifications of the duty found in Tarasoff. This section 
accomplishes this by taking the Tarasoff reasoning to its logical ends.  
A.  What Tarasoff Got Wrong 
There are two main flaws plaguing the Tarasoff decision. First, this 
section argues that the opinion was erroneous due to the absence of a 
discussion on the element of causation.  Secondly, it posits that the 
court’s analysis on the element of duty was, at best, incomplete.  
1.  Causation Analysis  
Perhaps the most defective part of the court’s opinion in Tarasoff is 
what is absent from it. Despite the court establishing that “Plaintiffs can 
state a cause of action against defendant therapists for negligent failure 
to protect,” it failed to discuss one of the four elemental parts to a 
typical claim for negligence.141 Plaintiffs are typically required to prove 
that the defendant’s misconduct was both the “but-for” and the 
“proximate” cause of the harm;142 however, this causation requirement 
was overlooked for the plaintiff in Tarasoff.  
Whether causation could have been proved by the plaintiff in Tarasoff 
is dubious. To conclude, notwithstanding the therapist’s failure to warn 
Tatiana or her family, that the murder would have never happened is 
speculative. It was entirely feasible that the therapist’s warning would 
have been unsuccessful in preventing the horrific murder. Yet, the court 
replaced this “but-for” causation analysis with a discussion of whether 
the victim was a foreseeable plaintiff and rested its decision almost 
entirely upon the affirmative answer to that question. To create a new 
tort that departs from settled law and foregoes a basic tenet of the 
underlying law without any justification was a questionable judicial 
leap.  
Perhaps an inclusion of Justice Andrew’s analysis of proximate cause 
would have provided more stability to Tarasoff laws. As previously 
established, Justice Andrews held that a determination of duty was an 
improper basis to limit liability; instead, under his method, proximate 
cause provided a more tangible method to deny a plaintiff’s claim. As 
will become clear when this section takes Tarasoff to its logical ends, a 
limit on the duty to protect third persons was the key element missing in 
the decision. Rather than assuming that this element was met, requiring 
 
 141. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 349 (Cal. 1976). 
 142. Supra Part II(A)(3). 
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the plaintiff in Tarasoff to prove that the therapist’s failure to take 
reasonable care in protecting Tatiana was the cause of her death was a 
potential limiting factor on liability. Yet, the court failed to engage in 
any discussion of causation, establishing precedent for future claims to 
similarly ignore this essential element of negligence.  
2.  Duty Analysis 
In Tarasoff, the dispositive issue was whether Poddar’s therapist 
owed a duty to warn Tatiana of her impending murder; therefore, the 
bulk of the opinion was focused on duty. As mentioned previously, there 
are many ways to perceive this intangible element.143 The Tarasoff court 
adhered to the majority approach, embodied by Justice Cardozo’s 
description of the term in Palsgraf, which described duty as the “sum 
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the 
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.”144 Therefore, the court 
perceived duty as the chief way to limit the liability of defendants in a 
negligence claim.  
 The court departed from the “general principle” that a person has no 
duty to control the conduct of another person, or to warn of that person’s 
conduct.145 To justify the parting from well-settled law that this duty 
existed only when the defendant had a special relationship between both 
the potential victim and dangerous person, the court utilized various 
tactics, some less persuasive than others. In doing so, the court 
highlighted that other jurisdictions have held “that the single 
relationship of a doctor to his patient is sufficient to support the duty to 
exercise reasonable care to protect others against dangers emanating 
from the patient’s illness.”146 
The court found most persuasive a North Dakota case involving a 
“dangerous mental patient.” There, the Veterans Administration (“VA”) 
placed a man whom they knew to be dangerous to work with a farmer, 
but failed to warn the farmer of the man’s mental health background.147 
The farmer allowed the man to use his car, which the man used as 
transportation to kill his wife.148 The North Dakota Court found that the 
VA breached a duty notwithstanding the lack of a special relationship 
between the VA and the wife.149  
 
 143. Supra Part (II)(A)(1). 
 144. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342 (quoting William L. Prosser, LAW OF TORTS 3d., 332-33 (1964)).  
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. at 344. 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. 
 149. Id.  
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This case is easily distinguishable from the facts of Tarasoff. Most 
importantly, the VA did not have a duty to warn the wife of her potential 
danger; rather, the VA was negligent in failing to inform the farmer of 
the patient’s violent tendencies.150 The VA placed the patient in a 
situation where the risk that he would cause great harm was greatly 
increased, and failed to mitigate the risk they created.151 While there 
may have been no special relationship between the VA and the victim, 
there arguably was a special relationship between the VA and the 
farmer, which was the foundation of the VA’s duty to warn the 
farmer.152  
In Tarasoff, however, the therapist had no role in creating a risk of 
harm to a victim. The recipient of the warning was different in these two 
cases. In Tarasoff, the required warning was from the therapist to the 
victim, Tatiana, or a family member. In the North Dakota case, the 
warning should have gone to the farmer who the VA placed the 
dangerous man with. Thus, the court’s reliance on this case was 
unpersuasive and did not provide sufficient justification for the 
departure from the previously held limitation on duties to third persons.  
Beyond a subsequent cite to a law review article, the court provided 
no further legal justification for this unprecedented expansion of duty.153 
Despite recognizing that duty is a compilation of policy considerations, 
the court failed to discuss the previous policy justifications behind 
limiting the duty to control third persons to situations where there exists 
a special relationship between the defendant, the victim, and the 
dangerous person.  
Furthermore, the court did not grant sufficient validation to the 
American Psychiatric Association’s (“APA”) policy concerns regarding 
the expansion of a therapist’s duty. Instead, the court attempted to 
alleviate qualms regarding a therapist’s ability to correctly identify 
dangerous patients by explaining that requiring a therapist to assess the 
dangerousness of a patient was the same standard other doctors are held 
to in diagnosing any other physical disease.154 The court thus concluded 
that a therapist may avoid liability merely by exercising the reasonable 
care.155   
Critics of Tarasoff suggest that the California Supreme Court was in 
 
 150. Merchs. Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967). 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id.  
 153. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d 334. “In their summary of the relevant rulings Fleming and Maximov 
conclude that the ‘case law should dispel any notion that to impose on the therapists a duty to take 
precautions for the safety of persons threatened by a patient, where due care so requires, is in any way 
opposed to contemporary ground rules on the duty relationship.’” Id.  
 154. Id.  
 155. Id.  
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no position to evaluate the APA’s amicus brief due to its lack of clinical 
or specialized knowledge about the inner-workings of the relationship 
between a therapist and a client.156 Others have argued that the court 
oversimplified the reality of psychological disorders by simply 
dichotomizing the question of dangerousness.157 Still, other analysts 
have identified practical differences between other medical diagnoses 
and dangerousness that cast doubt over the court’s analysis.158 The 
medically technical issues are interesting and pose a serious 
complication to the courts’ reasoning, but are beyond the scope of this 
article, which purports to focus on the legal and analytic issues inherent 
to Tarasoff. The court’s elementary comparison between mental health 
and physical health professionals was also plagued by legal and analytic 
implications, as well. Taking Tarasoff to its logical ends illuminates the 
flaws of the decision. 
3.  Logical Extensions of the Tarasoff Duty 
Tarasoff stands for the general proposition that when a special 
relationship exists, a person has a duty to take reasonable steps to 
prevent the misconduct of that person if that misconduct will likely 
inflict harm to a third party. To demonstrate the potentially endless 
liability that the espousal of duty found in Tarasoff could produce, it is 
instructive to apply the analysis to similar situations. Imagine: a patient 
with severe visual impairment tells an Optometrist that he intends to 
drive his friend in the waiting room without wearing his glasses; a 
patient tells a doctor about plans to operate heavy machinery on sleep 
medicine; a drunk bar patron forewarns the bartender that she anticipates 
driving a friend home.  In each of these examples, Tarasoff suggests that 
the optometrist, doctor, and bartender owe a duty to the third party to 
 
 156. See, e.g., Marin Roger Scordato, Post-Realist Blues: Formalism, Instrumentalism, and the 
Hybrid Nature of Common Law Jurisprudence, 7 NEV. L.J. 263, 295 (2007) (“The judges may have no 
direct experience whatsoever with psychiatrists or therapists, or their patients, or the therapeutic process. 
Worse still, they personally may have had some direct personal experience with therapists and 
psychiatric therapy and, as a result, be tempted to over-extrapolate from this very specific personal 
experience to therapists and patients and therapy in general. Moreover, this utterly uncertain and wholly 
random possession of specialized knowledge and experience regarding the activity affected by the legal 
doctrine at issue characterizes as much the attorneys who develop and deliver the arguments to the court 
as it does the judges who evaluate those arguments and ultimately decide.”) 
 157. Mossman, supra note 91, at 544 (“Tarasoff carries this dichotomization beyond the realm of 
facts about the world - a patient either does or does not commit violence, a therapist either takes or does 
not take protective action - to the realm of therapists' knowledge about those facts.”).   
 158. For example, there is less of a defined “standard of care” amongst mental health 
professionals as compared to other medical fields. Furthermore, often times dangerousness does not 
come with outward physical symptoms like many other diseases. Cynthia Grant Brown & Elizabeth 
Mertz, A Dangerous Direction: Legal Intervention in Sexual Abuse Survivor Therapy, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 549, 575 (1996). 
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take reasonable steps to prevent the specific threatened harm.  
Nowhere is the reasoning of Tarasoff more impactful than in the 
context of sexually transmitted diseases, particularly for doctors of 
patients with Acquired-Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Utilizing 
the rationale in Tarasoff, some plaintiffs have successfully sued the 
doctors of the individual from who they contracted the disease.159 One 
of the earliest of these cases came out of California, when a doctor failed 
to inform the patient, herself, of her condition and she was therefore 
unaware of the danger she posed to others by engaging in sexual 
relations.160  
As this liability has been structured on the framework established in 
Tarasoff, it is unsurprising that the state laws for disclosing HIV/AIDS 
status is similarly in disarray.161 For example, Massachusetts prohibits 
the disclosure of a patient’s AIDS status162 whereas Maryland permits 
the disclosure only if the affected patient refuses to inform sexual 
partners of their condition.163  Interestingly, and in stark juxtaposition to 
its stance on AIDS disclosure, Massachusetts is a mandatory reporting 
state for mental health professionals who perceive a threat to a third-
party’s life by a patient.164 
One final example hones in on the disconcertingly ambiguous 
limitation on the Tarasoff duty. As described in the introduction, after 
James Holmes murdered innocent movie-goers in Colorado, his 
therapist faced liability for breaching the duty she allegedly owed to her 
patient’s victims. At the time of the shooting, the Colorado Tarasoff 
statute imposed a duty on mental health professionals to warn threatened 
individuals and law enforcement only when the patient made an explicit 
and specific threat.165 At the criminal trial of James Holmes, his 
 
 159. Reisner v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (The patient 
contracted the disease many years prior when she was mistakenly given tainted blood in a blood 
transfusion. She died years later after engaging in a sexual relationship and transmitting the disease. The 
patient’s sexual partner subsequently filed suit against the doctor.); see also DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-
Chester Cnty, 559 A.2d 530 (Pa. Super. Ct.1989) (with substantially same facts and resulting liability 
for the doctor).  
 160. Reisner, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518.  
 161. See generally, Jacquelyn Burke, Discretion to Warn: Balancing Privacy Rights with the Need 
to Warn Unaware Partners of Likely HIV/AIDS Exposure, 35 BOSTON COLL. J. OF LAW & SOC. JUSTICE 
1-5(discussing the issues of Massachusetts’s duty to warn laws).  
 162. “A facility, as defined in section 70E, physician or health care provider shall not . . . disclose 
the results of such test to any person other than the subject of the test without first obtaining the 
subject’s written informed consent.” Mass. Ann. Laws Ch. 111, § 70F (Lexis 2017). 
 163. Md. Code Ann. § 18-337 (2010). If an HIV-positive individual refuses “to notify the 
individual’s sexual and needle-sharing partners, the individual’s physician may inform the local health 
officer and/or the individual’s sexual and needle-sharing partner of: (1) The individual’s identity; and 
(2) The circumstances giving rise to the notification.” Id. 
 164. Ann. Law. Mass. Ch. 123, § 36B (1989). 
 165. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-117 (superseded by amendment Jan 1, 2012). A therapist is free 
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therapist, Linda Fenton, testified that Holmes’ threats were not 
sufficiently specific to prompt any preventative actions;166 nevertheless, 
she was forced to fight a lawsuit alleging a violation of the statute.167  
This example demonstrates that imposing a limitation on duty based on 
the specificity of the threat does not provide a clearly defined line of 
where a therapists Tarasoff duty ends.  
Colorado legislatures apparently agreed, and in response to the 
Aurora shooting, amended its law.168 In a vain attempt to provide more 
clarity, the statute was amended to expand a therapist’s duty to warn 
when threats include less specific persons who are “identifiable by their 
association with a specific location or entity.”169 As previously 
discussed, one way to prove a breach of duty in a negligence claim is to 
prove that a statute was violated.170 Colorado’s statute now does not 
only expose therapists to liability if they fail to accurately predict the 
dangerousness of a patient, but also if they fail to single out persons 
“identifiable by their association.” Knee-jerk legislation that expands a 
therapist’s duty to warn is likely to exacerbate the practical issues 
discussed previously, especially considering amendments such as these 
are not a product of sound legal reasoning but rather an explicit response 
to tragedy.171  
Proponents of the extended Tarasoff duty, such as the Colorado 
legislature, cling to the notion that the duty-to-warn law promotes public 
safety; however, empirical research casts doubt on the efficacy of 
Tarasoff statutes. Other proponents rely on alternative barometers to 
suggest a limit on the duty created in Tarasoff. They argue that in the 
examples of the optometrist or bartender, the threat is not as likely to 
produce death to a third party at the rate that a threat against life by a 
 
from liability except “where the patient has communicated to the mental health care provider a serious 
threat of imminent physical violence against a specific person or persons. When there is a duty to warn 
and protect under the circumstances specified above, the duty shall be discharged by the mental health 
care provider making reasonable and timely efforts to notify any person or persons specifically 
threatened, as well as notifying an appropriate law enforcement agency or by taking other appropriate 
action including, but not limited to, hospitalizing the patient.” Id.  
 166. Ann O’Niel, Psychiatrist: Holmes thought 3-4 times a day about killing, CNN (April 25, 
2017), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/16/us/james-holmes-theater-shooting-fenton/. 
 167. Tom McGhee, Theater shooting victim’s wife sues Holmes’ psychiatrist, DENVER POST 
(April 25, 2017), http://www.denverpost.com/2013/01/15/theater-shooting-victims-wife-sues-holmes-
psychiatrist/. 
 168. “House Proposal Would Expand Duty to Report Threats” DENVER POST (April 26, 2017), 
http://www.denverpost.com/2014/03/05/house-proposal-would-expand-duty-to-report-threats/ (The 
Sponsor of the bill, representative Jovan Melton said, “So therefore if a threat is made toward one of our 
schools, or a theater, or some other public place, the therapist will then be able to have the tools to work 
with law enforcement and really protect our public interests and public safety.”). 
 169. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-117. 
 170. Supra Part (II)(A)(2). 
 171. Supra note 168. 
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therapist’s patient does, and the duty to warn would consequently not be 
triggered.172 Alternatively, it may be argued that in Tarasoff, the court’s 
reference to the “sufficient involvement” of a therapist in the lives of 
their patient as grounds to establish the duty is a limiting factor which 
would prevent the expansion of duty beyond a therapist.  
However, it is difficult to imagine creating a legal standard grounded 
in either of the likelihood of death or the involvement of the parties. 
These limits are not only arbitrary and lack definition, but they also 
seem to require an offensively intense inquiry into the relationship 
between a patient and doctor. Colorado’s recent expansion of its 
Tarasoff law further demonstrates that limiting therapists’ duty 
according to the specificity of their patients’ threat is a malleable and 
unreliable standard. Applying Tarasoff in other contexts demonstrates 
that there is no clear end to the duty it created; yet, looking back at the 
opinion provides the source of the issue.  
B.  The Root Cause   
The subsequent codifications of a therapist’s duty to potential victims 
of their patients have roots in the Tarasoff opinion.173 Therefore, the 
statutes themselves stand on unsteady ground as a consequence of 
spawning from an opinion that suffers severe gaps in legal reasoning. 
Specifically, it is the court’s failure to address causation and its inability 
to establish a feasible limit on the duty, which has created the serious 
discord among states as to when a therapist is liable to third parties.174 
When statutes cannot be grounded in sound legal principles and there is 
no clear policy goal, the result is, as demonstrated by the disarray of 
Tarasoff laws, chaos.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Though Tarasoff laws directly deal with the monetary liability 
imposed upon a therapist, the implications of these laws are ultimately 
matters of life and death. Therefore, the justifications behind them must 
be carefully scrutinized. Unfortunately, neither the legal reasoning nor 
 
 172. Jeffrey E. Barnett, Ask the Ethicist: Is there a Duty to Warn When Working with HIV-
Positive Clients?,  THE SOCIETY FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHOTHERAPY, http://societyforpsychotherapy.org/ask-the-ethicist-duty-warn-
working-hiv-positive-clients/.  
 173. See, e.g., Timothy E. Gammon & John K. Hulston, The Duty of Mental Health Care 
Providers to Restrain Their Patients or Warn Third Parties, 60 MO. L. REV. 749, 751-753 (1995) 
(“Missouri courts have relied on the reasoning and conclusions in Tarasoff to formulate Missouri law 
governing the duty a psychiatrist has to warn potential victims.”). 
 174. Supra Part (II)(A). 
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the practical goals which purport to validate Tarasoff laws withstand 
that scrutiny. The California Supreme Court’s rationalization for 
imposing liability on the therapist in Tarasoff not only lacked any 
discussion of causation, a necessary element of any tort, but also failed 
to provide convincing justification for the expansion of the duty it 
created. Worse still, it did not provide any feasible guidance on where 
the limit of the new duty exists. The consequences of these flaws are 
imminent. 
This article does not set out to conclusively solve the issues that have 
been created by Tarasoff, nor does it purport to adopt one state’s policy 
as the best. Rather, this article’s purpose was to argue that the root cause 
of the symptomatic disarray is the faulty legal reasoning utilized in 
Tarasoff. Going forward, if some coherence among the fifty 
jurisdictions of the United States is to be found, it is imperative to 
employ sound legal reasoning to establish the duty of therapists to 
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